1

ARE THE PARENTS TO BLAME? PREDICTING FRANCHISEE FAILURE
The Small Business Administration (SBA) 
PREDICTING FAILURE
Understanding the factors that influence borrowers' ability to repay a loan is critical both for lenders and loan guarantors. However, lenders often do not look at information specifically related to firm strategies when evaluating risk. For example, Small Business Administration (SBA) loan officers do not formally evaluate information on franchisor strategies when determining the riskiness of a loan to franchisees. Our study shows that this may be a costly omission.
Using information on such firm characteristics as total investment, earnings claims, advertising fees, growth rates, and franchise experience, franchisees and loan officers can better evaluate the risk of entering into a franchise agreement and of accepting loans. In turn, franchisors can reduce the risk of franchisee failure to pay SBA loans and, by extension, royalties due by following best practices for geographic dispersion, financial assistance and earnings claims. This paper uses an emerging area of predictive analytics to introduce a model that predicts franchisee failure using information on the franchising strategies employed by the parent franchise firm. The ramifications of the study are substantial for franchisors, franchisees and SBA loan officers who dispense public money to back franchise businesses. Our research is unique in three ways: First, it presents a new paradigm that allows researchers to use historical franchisor data to predict franchisee failure. Second, it introduces a novel and sophisticated, yet easy-to-use, modeling approach that both practitioners and business researchers can apply. Third, this study helps all involved parties (franchisors, franchisees, and lenders) to manage their respective levels of risk.
FRANCHISING
Franchising provides a central form of entrepreneurial venture creation and growth (Hoy and Shane 2003) . The industry has grown considerably in the recent past both in the U.S. and overseas. While in the U.S., Canada, and parts of Western Europe franchising has reached domestic market saturation, emerging markets remain relatively untapped (Anttonen, Tuunanen and Alon, 2005) .
Franchising Globally
Franchising is a popular international growth strategy through which companies can increase their sales and brand visibility. As the franchise sectors mature in the home market, franchisors who wish to grow must look to international markets (Hoffman and Preble, 2004) . Michael, S.C. (2003) argues that individuals across nations choose franchising when wages in their home nation are low, when unemployment is high, when the target nation is culturally distant from the U.S., and when opportunity for product differentiation through national media exists.
While examining the role of franchising in the macroeconomy of developing nations, Michael S.C. (2014) , found that franchising leads, rather than follows, economic development. Hoffman and Preble, 2004 found that 40 nations, representing 6 continents, appeared to have a substantial and active franchising industry replete with a trade association of their own.
However, in 2014, the World Franchise Council (WFC) had 45 registered national franchise associations thus indicating that there has been international growth and development in the industry. Table 1 illustrates the breakdown by continent.
Insert Table 1 business leaders reported that issues of financing and access to capital would be of greatest concern in the years ahead, and franchise sales/development would be the second greatest concern (IFA 2008; IFA 2009; IFA 2010) .
THE SBA's ROLE IN FINANCING FRANCHISES IN THE UNITED STATES
Franchising offers a major opportunity for entrepreneurial venture creation and growth (Hoy & Shane, 2003) , with the vast majority of participants in the franchise sector classified as small businesses (Gaulden & Jackson, 2004) . These small businesses are funded primarily by SBA-backed loans, including debt financing, surety bonds, and equity financing, all specifically designed to meet key financing needs. Conventional commercial loan markets may not offer small business owners access to the capital needed for growth, although the SBA does not make direct loans to small businesses. Rather, it sets loan guidelines and SBA partners (lenders, community development organizations, and micro lending institutions) make the actual loans.
The SBA guarantees that these loans will be almost fully repaid (i.e., 85%) eliminating some of the risk to lending partners (SBA, 2012).
The SBA primarily uses two programs for franchising-related loans: the 504 program and the 7(a) program (Wichmann & Kilpatrick, 2002; Glennon & Nigro, 2005) . In 2006, these programs backed more than $1.8 billion of SBA guarantees related to franchising, which is fueled by the ability and willingness of lenders to provide debt capital to franchisees. However, in today's financial environment, lenders evaluate more than the franchisee's portfolio, analyzing both the franchisor and overall systemic performance (FRANdata, 2011) .
Lenders apply various tools to make small business financing decisions, including established relationships and credit scoring-owner credit score or business credit score-or both (Cowan & Cowan, 2006) . Lenders also consider equity, experience, the business plan, and loan collateral (Deegan, 2003) .
The SBA does not extend financial assistance to businesses when the financial strength of the individual owners, or of the company itself, is sufficient to provide all or part of the financing. Therefore, both the business and the personal financial resources of the owners are reviewed as part of the eligibility criteria. The SBA also reviews the purpose of the business (forprofit or not), whether the business intends to be established in the US or its possessions, the size of the business, the purpose of the loan, the ability to repay on time based on projected operating cash flows, management expertise, commitment and character, all based on a "statement of personal history" and a feasible business plan (Wichmann & Kilpatrick, 2002; Glennon & Nigro, 2005; SBA, 2012) . In the case of franchising, even though the SBA evaluates both the parent firm (the franchisor) and the borrower (the franchisee), it is not clear how SBA includes parent firms' business characteristics and strategies when making a lending decision.
WHY BUSINESSES TURN TO FRANCHISING
The franchising research literature uses several theoretical arguments to explain franchise resource use and failure. Franchising allows the franchisor to extend scarce resources by seeking franchisees to finance expansion. Franchisors make multiple decisions related to franchisee qualifications, resources, abilities and communications about their own brand. To manage risk, franchisors prefer to franchise locations that have a lower profit potential and are more distant from their headquarters (Brickley & Dark, 1987) . Generally, geographic expansion and sales growth are cited as the main reasons for franchising (Alon, 2006; Julian & Castrogiovanni, 1995) .
Agency theory, sometimes referred to as "principal agent theory," refers to situations where one party (the principal) delegates work to another (the agent). In our case, the principal is the franchisor and the agent the employee manager or the franchisee. Agency theory assumes that each party is self-interested and has independent goals, thus prompting the principal to dedicate resources to ensure that the agent acts in the principal's best interest (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) .
Agency theory focuses on resolving two possible problems in agency relationships. First, the principal's and agent's desires or goals may conflict or it may be difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing and whether it is in the best interests of the principal. Second, risk-sharing may arise when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk and prefer different actions because of that. Agency theory posits that firms franchise because they are unable to monitor managers of company-owned outlets efficiently (Combs & Ketchen, 2003) . When managerial monitoring costs increase franchisors are more inclined to rely on franchising because franchisees should be self-motivated by their desire for outlet profits (Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991; Shane, 1996) .
Resource scarcity theory argues that firms franchise in order to access scarce resources, especially capital and managerial resources, to expand rapidly (Combs & Ketchen, 1999) . Small young firms may find it difficult to raise capital through traditional financial markets such as public stock offerings or existing operations, and they may consequently face obstacles in developing the requisite managerial talent (Martin, 1988; Shane, 1996) . Rapid expansion may be the easiest method to build economies of scale for purchasing and advertising necessary to compete effectively against more established firms (Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Polo-Redondo, Bordonaba-Juste & Palacios, 2011) . Resource scarcity theory suggests that firms initially franchise because they lack financial resources (capital scarcity), managerial resources (knowledge-based), and organization capabilities for expansion (Alon, 2006) . This theory maintains that once economies of scale are realized, the firm's focus shifts toward maximizing profits through firm ownership, called "ownership redirection" (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969) . Resource scarcity explains growth through franchising increases in the early years of a firm's operation while agency theory explains the use of franchising in the later years of a firm's life cycle (Castrogiovanni, Combs, & Justis, 2006) .
Signaling theory, based on economic contract theory, also examines franchising (Gallini & Lutz, 1992; Dant & Kaufmann, 2003) , focusing on the externalities of market imperfections and knowledge asymmetries to explain organizational choice. Entrepreneurs who are keen to attain the incentive advantages of franchising face an asymmetric information problem because franchisors face difficulties in signaling the quality of their concept to prospective franchisees.
Struggling franchisors also have an incentive to misrepresent their quality in an attempt to sell more outlets to franchisees (Dant & Kaufmann, 2003) . Such misrepresentations and false claims can create adverse selection problems for the users of that information, leading to moral hazard problems when the information varies across individual transactions or outlets due to external reasons (Akerlof, 1970; Eisenhardt, 1985; Holmstrom, 1979) . The many lawsuits that often surround franchising agreements are a testament to conflicts over misrepresentation. Policy makers in numerous states and countries have thus taken an active role to legislate franchisee relationships to address various issues such as termination and registration.
To counter the effects of information asymmetries, firms use signaling devices such as warranties, pricing, and advertising and promotion to signal product quality. For example, franchisors can powerfully and credibly signal their own confidence in the profit potential of their concept, its viability and robustness of their systems by operating a critical mass of company-owned outlets sure of the meaning here (Gallini & Lutz, 1992) . Signaling theory predicts that franchise systems will move toward a greater reliance on franchised outlets as systems mature (Dant & Kaufmann, 2003) .
A number of researchers have tried to reconcile the differences between agency and resource scarcity theories through a comprehensive model of causal connections from each paradigm (Alon, 2001; Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Combs & Ketchen, 2003) . Corresponding variables comparing the three theories are summarized in Table   2 .
Insert Table 2 about here
HOW FRANCHISING STRATEGIES PREDICT FRANCHISEE FAILURE
Data and methodology
In this study, loan defaults are used as a proxy for franchisee failure. In order to develop a predictive model of franchisee failure, we extracted information from three different datasets: for which we had both the franchise parameters and SBA data on the behavior of financial loans to franchisees (66 variables). A high level description of our final dataset used for modeling and analysis is provided in Table 3 .
Insert Table 3 here
Our modeling approach was based on a data mining technique called Structural Risk Minimization (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2001) implemented in a software application developed by KXEN that allows for the extraction of accurate, yet reliable, models, in the presence of massive noisy data. KXEN is an American software company, based in San Francisco, CA, that specializes in predictive analytics software.
Results
The best model of the failure rate of SBA-backed loans extracted from KXEN analysis is a predictive model with 13 variables. Figure 1 displays the performance of the model on the validation dataset, a dataset not used for modeling purposes, but reserved solely to assess the "closeness" of the predicted failure rate derived from the model to the actual failure rate. Ideally, one looks for a model whose predictions match the observed values exactly. This ideal situation is captured by the diagonal straight line. Figure 1 shows how well our model hugs the ideal diagonal line. The shaded area is the confidence band around the prediction line. Together, the model with these 13 variables explains 50.7% of the total variability seen in the failure rate of our modeling dataset. The ability of that model to generalize itself on a pristine dataset is captured as a reliability index, KI, of 80.9% (KXEN). Table 4 provides a measure of the relative contribution of each one of the 13 variables to the predictive model. It also identifies which theory each variable contributes to, based on inputs from Table 2 .
Insert Figure 1 here
Insert Table 4 here
The top four contributing variables include average total investment, industry type, number of company-owned outlets, and importance of experience in the specific industry.
The relationships among the variables and franchisee failure were often non-linear. For example, the association between the failure rate and the average total investment changes at $200,000. When the total investment is $200,000 or more, the failure rate is lower the greater the investment. However, up to $200,000, the higher the investment, the more likely the venture is to fail, perhaps due to a larger relative financial burden on small franchisees. Industry type is a categorization done as part of the analysis itself. This categorization, shown in Table 3 , is the second most important variable in our model.
• Group 1: Automotive, computer products and services, home décor and design, petrelated products and services, printing, retail food, and sports and recreation. This is the riskiest group.
• Group 2: Baked goods, beauty-related products, building and construction, child-related, clothing and accessories, education-related, fast food restaurants, frozen desserts, health and fitness, real estate, sit-down restaurants, retail stores, and general services.
• Group 3: Business-related services, lodging, and maintenance services. This is the lowest risk group.
The relationship between failure rate and percent of owned outlets appears also to be non-linear.
Failure rate is at its highest with very low percentage of owned outlets and steadily goes down till percent of owned outlets reaches about 9%, and then increases back for percentages between 9% and 15% to finally stabilizes after 15%.
Regarding the importance placed by franchisors on franchisee's experience in the specific industry they are entering, the higher the importance level, the lower the expected failure rate.
As to the impact of some of the other variables, the models points toward:
• A lack of earnings claims correlates with a higher failure rate.
• A high growth rate of the total outlets correlates with a low failure rate.
• A longer franchise experience (time in operation since the first franchise) tends to be correlated with lower failure rates whereas shorter experience (fewer than 12 years) correlates with higher failure.
HOW PRACTITIONERS CAN APPLY THE PREDICTIVE MODEL
This study presents empirical evidence on the use of historical franchisor variables to predict franchisee failure, especially SBA-backed loan defaults. Three stakeholder groups of franchising practitioners can benefit from the findings: SBA loan officers responsible for franchising, franchisors and franchisees. The section below offers suggestions and guidance for all three stakeholder groups.
Suggestions for lenders
Lenders use certain tools to evaluate a borrower's creditworthiness, including the five Cs of credit: 1) Character -signifying the borrower's integrity and reputation, 2) Capacity -encompassing the ability to repay and evidence of a sufficient cash flow to service the obligation, 3) Capital -the borrower's net worth, 4) Conditions -of the borrower and the overall economy, such as interest rates and the amount of principal requested, and, 5) Collateral -including the borrower's assets used to secure the debt.
The five Cs of credit are no panacea for today's credit challenges, but they do provide a handy checklist for evaluating a borrower's ability and willingness to pay.
1 The SBA and its lending partners use this checklist to evaluate franchisee creditworthiness.
This study proposes a 6 th C: Company (franchisor firm), based on a predictive model relating franchisor characteristics to loan behavior and establishing a scoring process for the franchisors. Once established, this scoring can easily be used as a 6 th C. Developing the 6 th C involves data mining techniques, such as the one employed in this study. Lenders, however, should be cautious, and ensure regular information updates. Using the 6 th C of credit adds another dimension for evaluating franchisee loan credibility, ultimately helping to reduce SBAbacked loan defaults and saving public money.
Guidance for franchisors and prospective franchisees
Franchisees who want to minimize the chances of loan default should choose a franchisor whose key characteristics and strategies help reduce franchisee failure. 
FUTURE RESEARCH
Our findings have some limitations. Data used in this study contain financial metrics on franchisors with 10 or more loans backed by the SBA. Thus, the findings are limited to more experienced franchisors. A similar modeling approach might detect differences between younger and older franchise systems. Data reporting, which is voluntary and does not cover all SBA-does not enforce reporting the loan status. Since the lenders are not obliged to provide this information to the SBA, they may be reluctant to report excessive failures and charge-off rates that are not good for business.
Opportunities exist to expand the analysis to countries other than the US to see if the same failure factors apply. Our data may however not be typical in other countries and therefore generalizability outside the US is still unknown.
Although our study makes a unique contribution to loan failure research by evaluating the use of multiple historical franchisor variables to predict the potential default (failure) rate of franchisees, our variables are not exhaustive. Future research could entail assessing managerial level-data, for example, to enhance the predictive model. Average equity investment, number of franchised outlets, royalty fees, number of company-owned outlets, average franchise fees, growth rate of total outlets, franchise experience, size of corporate staff, percentage of projected outlets over the total, average total investment, number of states in the U.S., and total outlets. Signaling theory State of earnings claims, advertising fees, growth rate of total outlets, number of company-owned outlets and franchise experience.
